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After  the  disbandment  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact,  Russia  pinned  its  hopes o n  t h e  
dissolution  of  NATO  and  on  the  OSCE 
becoming  the  major  regional  security 
organisation  in  the  Euro-Atlantic  area. 
However,  taking  advantage  of  Russia’s 
weakness,  NATO  went  through  several 
enlargement  rounds,  even  incorporating 
parts of the former Soviet Union. Russia 
has now recovered and considers that the 
era  of  unipolarity  is  giving  way  to  a 
“polycentric international system”. The war 
in  Georgia  and  the  financial  crisis  have 
demonstrated that sufficient critical mass 
has  been  achieved  to  transform  the 
international system. Russia is proposing 
to  fix  de  jure  the  political  commitments 
undertaken  within  the  OSCE  and  the 
NATO-Russia  Council.  Russia  wants  a 
legally  binding  document,  a  European 
Security Treaty. The question is to what 
extent this is in the interest of the West? 
 
In  Berlin  in  June  2008  the  Russian  president 
Medvedev  made  a  first  proposal  for  a  new 
European  security  architecture  in  the  form  of  a 
legally  binding  treaty.1 A f t e r  t h e  w a r  i n  G e o r g i a ,  
                                                             
1  The  English  version  is  available  at, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type8
2912type82914type84779_202153.shtml  
Russia began promoting a new approach in security 
more  actively.  In  October  2008,  in  Evian, 
Medvedev proposed an international conference to 
discuss  security  questions  in  Europe.2 A l t h o u g h  
Russian diplomacy in the meantime referred several 
times  to  these  proposals  and  Medvedev  repeated 
them  in  Helsinki  in  April  2009,3 t h e y  r e m a i n e d  
extremely  vague  until  Russia  presented  a 
comprehensive  and  coherent  proposal  on  the 
subject  at  the  OSCE  Annual  Review  Conference  in 
Vienna (23 – 24 June 2009). 4 
Why  does  Russia  want  to  change  the 
existing security architecture in Europe? 
Russia considers that the era of unipolarity is giving 
way  to  a  “polycentric  international  system”  with  new 
centres of economic growth and political influence.5 
                                                             
2 T h e  E n g l i s h  v e r s i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  a t ,  
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type8
2912type82914_207457.shtml  
3 T h e  E n g l i s h  v e r s i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  a t ,  
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/04/20/1919_type8
2912type82914type84779_215323.shtml  
4 Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov 
at  the  Opening  of  the  OSCE  Annual  Security  Review 
Conference, Vienna, June 23, 2009, Hard security challenges in the 
Euro-Atlantic region. The role of the OSCE in creating a sustainable and 
effective  security  system, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005b
cbb3/9eb56f1ecaad3ab5c32575df00362cc9?OpenDocument 
5 Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov 
for  the  European  business  Association  in  Russia,  Moscow, 
December 10, 2008, The Role of Russian-EU co-operation and of their  
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The  war  in  Georgia  and  the  financial  crisis  have 
demonstrated that sufficient critical mass has been 
achieved to transform the international system.  
The major conflicts during the last years, from the 
Balkans to the Caucasus, were systemic breakdowns 
of  the  existing  security  architecture.  The  existing 
system suffers from several serious shortcomings. 
Firstly, the West still has a “bloc approach” to security 
in  Europe;  the  CFE  controversy  is  the  most 
illustrative  example  of  this  attitude.  Furthermore, 
Russia  cannot  accept  that  a  single  group  of 
countries – NATO, under American leadership – 
has  exclusive  rights  to  shape  European  security. 
Secondly, the West continues to approach security 
ideologically.  Russia  does  not  accept  the  western 
moral approach to international politics; it uses the 
concept  of  sovereign  democracy t o  u n d e r l i n e  i t s  
independence from and moral parity with the West. 
And finally, a plethora of security organisations and 
arrangements have sprung up over the last decennia 
so that some restructuring is overdue. 
The main systemic shortcoming is the infringement 
on a basic principle of the 1999 Charter for European 
Security and of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), viz 
the principle of the indivisibility of security – the 
commitment not to strengthen one’s security at the 
expense of the security of other States.  
In the nineties Russia had hoped for the dissolution 
of  NATO  following  the  disbandment  of  the 
Warsaw  Pact.  The  OSCE  would  have  become  a 
fully-fledged  regional  collective  security 
organization within the terms of Chapter VII of the 
UN  Charter.  Instead  NATO  expanded,  first 
absorbing  the  former  Soviet  satellites,  and  then 
encroaching  upon  parts  of  the  former  Soviet 
Union.  This  not  only  divided s o c i e t i e s  b u t  a l s o  
encouraged some countries to embark on military 
adventures. 
Russia  also  observes  a  collision  between  pan-
European  and  intra-bloc  approaches.  Within  the 
framework  of  the  OSCE  the  West  professes  the 
indivisibility  of  security  from  Vancouver  to 
                                                                                       
business communities under conditions of the financial and economic crisis 
and an assessment of the potential in the intermediate term of interaction on 
the  European  continent. T h e  R u s s i a n  v e r s i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  a t ,  
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/F54FF6DCD2C14E6DC3257
51B00501E13  
Vladivostok.  However,  in  NATO  this  becomes 
from Vancouver to Brest-Litovsk on the Belarusian 
border.  Furthermore,  whereas  in  the  OSCE  the 
principle of the indivisibility of security is a political 
commitment,  in  NATO  it  has  legal  force. 
Therefore, pan-European commitments should also 
acquire legal force through a legally binding treaty, 
involving not only individual states but also relevant 
international organizations within the Euro-Atlantic 
area. 
Another systemic drawback of the present security 
system is the global character of emerging threats 
and the narrow group approach to their solutions. 
These threats stem from lack of trust, national and 
religious grounds, and non-state actors.  
Furthermore, there is overlap and duplication, and 
even  competition  between  the  many  sub-regional 
organizations  active  in  the  OSCE  space. 
Coordination  is  needed.  A  framework  of 
cooperation  exists  already  in  the  Platform  for 
Cooperative Security adopted at the OSCE Summit in 
Istanbul in 1999, but its potential remains unused. 
Another  problem  is  the  inconstancy  of  priorities, 
not defined on the basis of international obligations 
but of political expediency. For instance, previously 
the  West  considered  the  CFE  Treaty t h e  
cornerstone  of  European  Security.  Once  the 
reduction  of  the  heavy  weapon  holdings  of  the 
Warsaw Pact had been carried out, ratification of 
the  Adapted  Treaty  was  postponed  indefinitely. 
Another  example  is  The  Vienna  Document  of  the 
Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 
that  has  not  been  updated  the  last  ten  years  and 
whose  provisions  are  moribund.  And  finally,  the 
West  wields  double  standards  with  regard  to 
conflict settlement; Kosovo has been recognized by 
most  Western  countries  whereas  Abkhazia  and 
South Ossetia haven’t.  
Russia’s  proposals  at  the  OSCE  Annual 
Review Conference 23-24 June 2009 
Russia  proposes  a  European  Security  Treaty 
restricted to the field of hard security.6 The Russian 
                                                             
6  The  Helsinki  Final  Act  encompassed  three  main  sets  of 
recommendations, which are often referred to as 'baskets'. These 
three baskets are; questions relating to security in Europe; co-
operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology,  
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proposal  at  the  OSCE  Annual  Review  Conference  in 
Vienna in June 2009 reiterates the need to create a 
reliable  collective  security  system  in  the  Euro-
Atlantic Area based on the principles of polycentrism, 
the rule of international law, the central role of the 
UN, the unity and indivisibility of the security of all 
states,  the  inadmissibility  of  the  isolation  of  any 
state or the creation of zones of different levels of 
security.  
A first part would confirm the basic principles of 
relations between states. Central to the agreement 
would  be  that  no  state  should  ensure  its  own 
security at the expense of others. Unilateral security 
at the cost of third parties is unacceptable; actions 
that  undermine  common  security  – i . e .  m i l i t a r y  
alliances  - m u s t  b e  r e m o v e d ;  a n d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  
existing military alliances is unacceptable if this goes 
contrary  to  the  interests  of  another  party.  Each 
country  could  call  upon  this  principle  of  the 
indivisibility of security even if a sovereign country 
wishes  to  become  a  member  of  a  security  or 
defence  organisation.  The  treaty  should  reaffirm 
that  no  single  state  or  international  organization 
could  have  exclusive  rights  of  maintaining  peace 
and  stability  in  the  Euro-Atlantic  area.  This  is 
clearly aimed at the US and NATO. For Russia the 
US and NATO are the main obstacle to a return to 
the status of major power in Europe.   
A  second  part w o u l d  a d d r e s s  a r m s  c o n t r o l ,  
confidence-building,  restraint  and  reasonable 
sufficiency in military doctrine. 
A third part would deal with conflict settlement and 
provide  principles  to  be  applied  uniformly  to  all 
crisis situations. It emphasizes the development of 
mechanisms of collective coordination for conflict 
prevention and settlement. In order to avoid double 
standards and to prevent conflicts from getting out 
of  hand,  the  use  of  force  is  inadmissible,  parties 
should  come  to  an  agreement  themselves a n d  
settlement of conflict should be gradual.  
And  finally,  a  fourth  part w o u l d  b e  d e d i c a t e d  t o  
countering  new  threats,  including  proliferation  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction,  international 
                                                                                       
and of the environment; and co-operation in humanitarian and 
other fields. 
terrorism,  drug  trafficking  and  transborder 
organized crime. 
The treaty would explicitly limit its scope to hard 
security  issues  because  Russia  “believes  a  critical 
number of irritants have accumulated precisely in the field of 
hard security” and “the last two baskets did not suffer from 
erosion of the fundamental principles”.7  
Finally negotiations on a European Security Treaty 
should be launched by a meeting of heads of state 
and  heads  of  intergovernmental  organisations 
operating  in  the  field  of  the  Euro-Atlantic  security,  i.e. 
OSCE,  NATO,  EU,  CIS  and  the  Collective  Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO).8 This could take place in 
the framework of the Platform for Cooperative Security. 
The  Treaty  should  focus  on  politico-military 
security. 
At the Informal Meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers on 
the Future of European Security at Corfu on 27-28 June 
2009  the  Corfu  Process w a s  l a u n c h e d .  W a y s  f o r  a  
more  structured  dialogue  will  be  explored.  The 
participating  states  see  no  alternative  to  the 
restoration  of  the  concept  of  indivisible,  co-
operative and comprehensive security. On the other 
hand they reaffirmed the validity of the whole set of 
commitments  in  all  three  OSCE  dimensions  and 
agreed  on  the  necessity  to  fully  implement  these 
commitments.  
Summing up the Russian proposal  
Russia  will  remain  an  independent  international 
player.  It  considers  that  NATO  and  EU 
enlargements  have  practically  reached  their  limits. 
Some countries will remain for a foreseeable future 
outside  the  framework  of  the  EU  and  NATO. 
Therefore, a treaty is necessary for these non-EU 
and non-NATO states that need a reliable, legally-
binding security architecture. 
                                                             
7 Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov 
at  the  Opening  of  the  OSCE  Annual  Security  Review 
Conference, Vienna, June 23, 2009. 
8  On  the  7th o f  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 2 ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t s  o f  Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a 
charter  in  Tashkent,  founding  the  Collective  Security  Treaty 
Organisation ( CSTO) o r  t h e  T a s h k e n t  T r e a t y .  Georgia  and 
Azerbaijan  were  members  of  the  former  Collective  Security 
Treaty of the CIS, but did not join the CSTO.  
 
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
4 
#1 
September 2009 
Russia is asking the members of the OSCE to fix de 
jure  the  political  commitments  undertaken  within 
the  OSCE  and  the  NRC.  Russia  wants  a  legally 
binding document, a European Security Treaty.  
Central  to  the  Treaty  would  be  the  issue  of  the 
indivisibility  of  security  and  the  principle  of 
restraining one’s own security at the expense of the 
security  of  other  states.  Russia  insists  that  its 
proposal is not aimed at undermining NATO. On 
the contrary, it is meant to enhance coordination 
and  synergies  among  the  existing  international 
organizations. 
Western Reactions 
The  West  and  Russia  have  no  alternative  but  to 
engage  each  other  in  European  security  matters. 
This  engagement  should  reach  further  than  mere 
discussions  and  result  in  concrete  cooperation. 
From a Western point of view, the background to 
any security dialogue remains the close association 
between  the  European  Union  and  the  Atlantic 
alliance and the need to reconstruct a partnership 
with Russia. 
From  the  outset,  the  Russian  proposals  were 
received  with  suspicion  in  the  West  although 
several countries did not want to reject them out of 
hand.9 They feared the aim was to provoke discord, 
on the one hand within Europe and on the other 
hand between Europe and the US. Initially only the 
US, the UK, the Baltic States and Poland openly 
showed their rejection, other countries such as Italy, 
Germany and France expressed interest to a more 
or lesser degree. Russia skilfully exploits the vision 
of some European countries for a larger role for the 
European Union in a multipolar world. By doing so 
Russia hopes to weaken the transatlantic link. The 
European  security  architecture  would  then  be 
supported by three pillars; Russia, the EU and the 
US. Russia would gain considerable relative weight 
and could hope for support of the EU against the 
US in some disputes.  
Russia considers itself as the counterpart of the US. 
It is paradoxical that Russia on the one hand sees a 
                                                             
9 For possible Russian hidden objectives of this proposal see, 
Marcel  H.  Van  Herpen,  Medvedev’s  Proposal  for  a  Pan  European 
Security Pact, its Six hidden Objectives and how the West should respond, 
Cicero Working Paper WP 08 – 03. 
need for a new security architecture because of the 
ideological bloc-approach by the West and on the other 
hand proposes a structure which ultimately risks to 
result in two blocs centred on the US/NATO/EU 
and Russia/CIS/CSTO.  
Evaluation of the Russian proposals 
Events  in  the  last  15  years  have  indeed 
demonstrated that there is a need for improvement 
of  the  existing  security  architecture.  Several 
questions arise with regard to the Russian proposal. 
Firstly,  can  progress  be  made  within  the  existing 
framework, or has a new architecture to be created? 
Secondly, is a legally binding treaty indispensable, or is 
a political commitment sufficient? Thirdly, should 
such  an  agreement  or  treaty  be  limited  to  hard 
security, or is it essential that all three baskets of the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  should  be  part o f  i t ?    
Furthermore,  security  being  a  comprehensive 
concept, are there some other elements that should be 
part of or linked to an overall deal? Fourthly, is it 
acceptable that, under the guise of the indivisibility 
of security, a country or group of countries can veto 
decisions  of  sovereign  states  to  join  a  defence 
organisation?  
Is  there  a  need  for  new  security 
architecture in Europe? 
Russia certainly has a point when it identifies as one 
of  the  main  problems  the  large  number  of 
European  security  organisations  and  the  lack  of 
coordination between them. However, creating one 
more is perhaps not the most efficient way to solve 
the problem. The OSCE and its related instruments 
have all the prerequisites to continue to serve as the 
main collective security organisation in the Euro-
Atlantic area where a renewed security dialogue can 
take  place.  Overlap  and  duplication  will  not  be 
solved  by  adding  another  tier  to  the  European 
Security Architecture. 
Is there a need for a legally binding treaty? 
The  main  Russian  argument  seems  to  be  that 
NATO and the EU offer their members a legally 
binding treaty to guarantee their security and that 
non-NATO and non-EU members are left out in 
the cold.   
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The  OSCE  is  a  regional  collective  security 
organization responsible for security issues between 
its  members.    It  consists  of  a  set  of  political 
commitments although legally binding treaties exist 
within its framework, e.g. the CFE Treaty. NATO, 
on  the  contrary,  is  originally  a  collective  defence 
organisation consisting of allies who are prepared to 
defend  each  other  against  an  outside  threat.  The 
EU,  through  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  also  covers  its 
members  with  a  legally  binding  defence  clause.10 
Moreover, the main principles of collective security 
are already included in a legally binding document, 
viz the Charter of the United Nations. 
No  mention,  however,  is  made  in  the  Russian 
reasoning  of  the  CSTO.  Article  3  of  the  CSTO 
Charter  states:  “The  purposes  of  the  Organization 
(CSTO)  are  to  strengthen  peace  and  international  and 
regional  security  and  stability  and  to  ensure  the 
collective defence of the independence, territorial 
integrity  and  sovereignty  of  the  member  States, 
[…]”. S o ,  t e c h n i c a l l y  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  
protected  under  any  legally  binding  Treaty  are 
Switzerland,  the  states  of t h e  F o r m e r  Y u g o s l a v i a  
(except  NATO  members  Slovenia  and  Croatia), 
Ukraine,  Moldova,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia  and 
Turkmenistan.  
Striving  for  a  legally  binding  European  Security 
Treaty,  therefore,  seems  superfluous  and  would 
certainly  water  down  its  contents  in o r d e r  t o  b e  
acceptable to the major powers. However, specific 
agreements could, of course, be legally binding. 
Should an agreement or treaty be limited to 
hard security? 
In his speech of April 2009 Medvedev placed his 
proposal  in  the  continuation  of  the  Helsinki 
process, as a Helsinki-plus adapted to the security 
challenges  of  the  21st c e n t u r y .  H o w e v e r ,  h u m a n  
rights,  democratisation  or  rule  of  law  and 
cooperation in other fields would not be part of the 
                                                             
10 Art 49.c.7. of the Lisbon Treaty: “If a Member State is the 
victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by 
all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the 
United  Nations  Charter.  This  shall  not  prejudice  the  specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States.” 
agreement.  To  refer  to  Helsinki  seems  therefore 
more for appearances’ sake.  
Security  is  a  comprehensive  concept.  The  three 
baskets of the Helsinki process are inseparable. The 
Russian point of view that the last two baskets did not 
suffer from erosion of the fundamental principles is flawed.  
It is not convincing to argue that the principles of 
cooperation  in  the  fields  of  economics, 
environment and in the humanitarian issues do not 
have  to  be  updated.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  to 
safeguard the Helsinki acquis and to insist that the 
other baskets, adapted to the present environment, 
should  be  part  of  comprehensive  security 
architecture.  
Russia’s main concern is – understandably - in the 
field of hard security. However, energy security is 
also at the centre stage of geopolitical thinking, in 
Russia as well in Europe and the US. If security is 
to be comprehensive, energy security should be part 
of  any  European  security  architecture.  It  would, 
therefore,  be  advisable  to  require  in  parallel  an 
agreement on energy security. For years Russia has 
refused to ratify the Energy Charter. In Davos in 
January 2009 Prime Minister Putin called for a new 
energy charter. The outcome of discussions on this 
topic  should  be  linked  to  the  broader  talks  on 
European security. 
Veto power? 
According to the Russian viewpoint, each country 
could call upon the principle of the indivisibility of 
security  even  if  a  sovereign  country  wishes  to 
become  a  member  of  a  security  or  defence 
organisation. Concretely this means that a situation 
similar  to  the  last  stages  of  the  Cold  War  would 
come about. Spheres of influence would be legally 
demarcated by treaty. US/NATO/EU and Russia 
/CIS/CSTO would become separated by a scaled-
down  buffer z o n e  o f  n e u t r a l  c o u n t r i e s ,  v i z  t h e  
states that are not part of NATO, the EU or the 
CSTO. Such a power to veto sovereign countries to 
choose their alliances and defence arrangements is 
unacceptable as it would lead to a new scaled-down 
Yalta rather than to a new Helsinki. 
Proposals 
The  West  should  be  prepared  to  constructively 
engage  in  a  European  Security  Dialogue ( E S D ) .   
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However, from the outset it should be made clear 
that  certain  basic  principles  are  not  open  for 
discussion. Firstly, there is no need for a new tier in 
security  organisations,  the  existing  organisations 
and mechanism should be preserved and adapted. 
Secondly, the transatlantic link is not negotiable; it 
remains the keystone of our security. Thirdly, the 
Helsinki acquis in all its three dimensions has to be 
preserved  and  to  be  an  integral  part  of  any 
agreement.  And  fourthly,  no  state  can  veto  the 
decision of any other state to choose its alliances: 
no new Yalta. 
The OSCE, as the repository of a comprehensive 
set  of  commitments  including  democracy,  the 
promotion  of  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms  and  a  wide  range  of  politico-military, 
economic and environmental commitments, seems 
the obvious main forum for an ESD. The OSCE 
should  be  strengthened  as  the  forum  for  broad 
dialogue on comprehensive security.  
This should be done by revitalizing discussions in 
the  politico-military  dimension  and  giving  a  new 
impetus to conventional arms control. The OSCE’s 
conflict  prevention  capacity  should  be  increased 
and if necessary new mechanisms should be created 
for  prevention,  mediation  and  post-crisis 
management. Furthermore, the OSCE’s potential to 
address new challenges like the financial, economic, 
climate  and  energy  aspects  of  security  should  be 
explored.  An  agreement  on  energy  security,  a 
mutual commitment not to endanger each other’s 
energy supply, should be part of a final agreement. 
Essential is the enhancement of cooperation against 
common threats such as terrorism and proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction.  
Therefore, when engaging in an ESD all elements 
of security, also new ones like energy security and 
new threats, have to be discussed in parallel.  
However,  work  in  the  OSCE  should  be 
complemented and reinforced through discussions 
in  other  forums,  such  as  NRC,  NUC,  and  EU-
Russia,  US-Russia a n d  e v e n  i n  t h e  C ouncil  of 
Europe. Full use should be made of the Platform 
for  Cooperative  Security,  “in  order  to  strengthen 
cooperation  between  the  OSCE  and  other  international 
organizations and institutions, thereby making better use of 
the resources of the international community”.  Extensive 
and  continuous  consultation  and  coordination 
within  NATO  and  EU  will  be  of  the  utmost 
importance. 
Fruitful  discussions  on  a  new  European  Security 
Treaty or architecture suppose a minimum of trust. 
Russia  should  honour  its  commitments  under 
existing  agreements,  above  all  those  involving 
respect  of  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity. 
Restoring trust requires willingness to fulfil those 
commitments. 
Brigadier  General  (Ret.)  Patrick  Nopens 
retired from the Belgian army in December 
2008.  He  worked  at  the  WEU,  NATO 
and  SHAPE.  From  2000  to  2004  and 
from  2007  to  2008  he  served  as  defence 
attaché in Moscow. 
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